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Complex plant located at Fatehjang. It is estimated
that the maximum number of propulsion units of
Ghaznavi, Shaheen 1 and Shaheen 2 adds to a
total of 12 units annually and the current production
is lower than this number. The immediate
production emphasis will be towards a) preparation
of further numbers of Shaheen 1 for handing over
to the Army Strategic Force Command by 2008;
and b) completion of further flight tests of Shaheen
2. It is estimated that four to five years of full
capacity production effort is required for matching
the missile numbers to the missile borne nuclear
warheads.
Introduction
Pakistan has developed and launched ballistic
missiles with different ranges coming under the
Hatf 1 to Hatf 6 nomenclature. The missiles have
alternate designations like Abdali, Ghaznavi,
Ghauri and Shaheen. All the missiles with
the exception of Ghauri employ solid rocket
propulsion. Beginning with the launch of Hatf 1 in
Feb 1989, launch of these missiles has been
reported by the Pakistani and the International
Press at periodic intervals. Since the year 2002,
there is an increase in the launch frequency
and range of the missiles. This would indicate
that Pakistan’s capability to produce solid
propellant missile has made substantial
progress and is not to be under-estimated.
An attempt is made in this paper to assess
Pakistan’s solid propellant missile production
capacity.
Summary
Pakistan has an active ballistic missile programme
comprising four missiles based on solid propellant
and one missile based on liquid propellant.
Frequent reports are seen in the media regarding
the missile flights along with statements pertaining
to completion of troop exercises and handing over
to the Army Strategic Force Command. In this
report an attempt is made to assess the solid
propellant based production capacity and gauge
the number of missiles that may be produced and
that may be in stock in Pakistan.
It is well known that the Pakistan missile effort
has drawn extensively upon French and Chinese
inputs pertaining to technology, equipment and
materials. At the same time Pakistan appears to
have developed capability to indigenously design
and realise solid propulsion systems for use in
ballistic missiles. Using this and other inputs, an
assessment of material requirements is made for
the principal subsystems. Process cycle for the
propellant and nozzle realisation and the process
time are estimated to arrive at the possible
throughput in missile propulsion systems. These
numbers are compared with the actual reported
flight numbers of the missiles to arrive at the
possible numbers produced, the number in stock
and the deployment status.
It is argued that the Abdali is made in the Space
and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission
(SUPARCO) propellant plant while the other
missiles are made in the National Defence
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Dauphin1—and was limited in range and
performance. For Pakistan to narrow or annul
the technology gap in a short period of time,
indigenous development was not the answer. The
answer lay in leap-frogging through technology
acquisition to aid the indigenous capability and
this is what Pakistan set about doing.
By the early eighties, the Chinese had decided to
change over to solid propellant systems for their
missile programme.2 By this time their avionics,
control and guidance systems had also attained
a level of maturity. Adapting them to the solid
propulsion systems was fairly straightforward. The
DF 15 / M 9 and the DF 11 / M 11 are the better
known of the shorter range solid propulsion
missiles developed by the Chinese for both
domestic use and the export market. The M 9
development started in 1984 and the missile was
deployed in 1988. The M 11 development started
in 1985 with operational deployment of the missile
in 1988. This period matches fairly well with
Pakistan’s attempt towards missile parity with
India. The chronology of missile development
in Pakistan and its comparison with the rocket /
missile technology status in India is listed in
table 1.
1 See S. Chandrashekar “An Assessment of Pakistan’s missile capability”, Missile Monitor, Number 3, 1993 For an update see
S Chandrashekar, Arvind Kumar and Rajaram Nagappa, “An Assessment of Pakistan’s Ballistic Missile Programme: Technical and
Strategic Capability” NIAS Report R5-06, Oct 2006, (Bangalore: National Institute of Advanced Studies).
2 For a detailed documentation of this effort see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force
Modernisation in the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).
Background
The development of solid rockets in India and
Pakistan started about the same time in the early
1960’s. Both the countries obtained sounding
rocket technology from Sud-Aviation of France and
set up manufacturing facilities. Both programmes
were set up by civilian organisations—the Indian
National Committee for Space Research
(INCOSPAR) in India and SUPARCO in Pakistan.
The similarity perhaps ends there. India went on
to build a strong civil space programme improving
on the solid rocket technologies and developing
other launch vehicle technologies. Missile
development in India started later as a totally
separate programme and evolved on its own.
The rocket technology attempts in Pakistan on the
other hand, after an initial spell of sounding rocket
launch activity, went into a period of lull. Perhaps
the Indian Guided Missile Development
Programme (IGMDP) initiative in 1983 stirred up
the missile development activity in Pakistan as
evident from the launch of Hatf 1, which more or
less coincided with the initial launches of India’s
Prithvi and Agni missiles. The Hatf 1 was derived
from the French sounding rockets—Dragon and
3
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It appears that the Pakistan’s Ghaznavi missile is
derived from China’s M 11 and there are
similarities in the missile configurations. The
analysis of the missile image confirms the
1980's Major strides in civil
launch vehicle
programme
IGMDP is launched in July
1983.





HATF 1 is test fired in the
late 1980's
China completes the development of
M 9 and M 11 missiles.
Pakistan signs an agreement with
China for the procurement of 34-80 M
11 missile systems and a smaller
number of M 9 missile systems3.
1990's Operationalisation of Agni
1 and development of
variants.




developed. There is an
increase in the launch
frequency
US intelligence detects missile
manufacturing facility at Fatehjang4.
The facility is reported to be built by the
Chinese in 1997 or 1998.
2000's Flight tests of IGMDP
missiles
22 missile launches
between 2002 & 2006
similarities but shows that the Ghaznavi is shorter
than M 11 in length5. The findings of the analysis
are summarised in Table 2.  
1970's Technology indigenisation
in the Civil Space
programme
No significant event Lull in SUPARCO activities from 1973
3 State Department Posting Text, n. 230, July 2, 1991 (STATE  DEPARTMENT ON CHINA: M-11 MISSILE), available at the website:
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/mtcr/news/910702-188884.htm
4 The details on this manufacturing facility can be seen on the website: http://www.nti.irg/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Missile/
3294_3327.html The facility is stated to be a copy of the M 11 plant in China’s Hubei province and is located at Fatehjang a suburb
of Rawalpindi
5 n.1 , S. Chandrashekar, Arvind Kumar, Rajaram Nagappa, pp. 12-13
Table 1: Pakistani Missile Development Chronology
Year Indian Event Pakistani event Remarks









from Sud Aviation, France
SUPARCO launched over 70 sounding
rockets such as Judi-Dart, Nike family,
Centaure, Dragon and Petrel.
Production and assembly facilities
would have formed part of the licence
agreement.
4
Assessment of Ballistic Missile Production Capacity in Pakistan
Another assessment6 shows the length and
diameter of M 11 to be 9.09 m and 1.01 m
respectively. Most sources however indicate the
diameter to be 0.88 m. The estimated range of
this missile is 280 to 350 km with 800 kg / 500 kg
payload. This violates the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) export restrictions and
consequently, it is possible that the Chinese may
have sold a shorter MTCR compliant version of
the M11 to Pakistan. The image analysis carried
out by Chandrashekar et al confirms the similarity
between the shorter version of the M 11 warhead
(3.80 to 4 m long) and the one used on the
Ghaznavi. The analysis also confirms that the
rocket motor is shorter than the M 11 rocket motor.
However its estimated range with a 1000 kg and
700 kg payload is 269 km and 347 km respectively.
This would suggest that this export did violate
MTCR regulations.
Similar co-relationship between the Chinese M 9 and
the Shaheen 1 missile are seen. Table 3 provides
details of the measurements made by Chandrashekar
et al on the Shaheen 1 and the M 9 missiles.
6 Mark Wade, “Encyclopedia Astronautica” available at the website: www.astronautix.com/lvs/shkval.htm
Table 2: M 11 Ghaznavi Missile Characteristics
Missile Length, m Diameter, m
Warhead Motor Total
M 11 N.A N.A 11.34 0.89
3.81 m 5.76 m 9.57 m
4.09 m 6.54 m 10.65 m
4.80 m 6.17 m 10.97 m
Ghaznavi 3.76 m 5.05 m 8.81 m 0.91
4.01 m 4.90 m 8.91 m
4.31 m 5.17 m 9.48 m
4.11 m 4.80 m 8.90 m
Table 3: Shaheen-1/M 9 Missile Characteristics
Image Warhead (m) Motor+nozzle (m) Length (m)
Image 1 (Shaheen 1) N.A N.A 9.62 m
Image 2 (Shaheen 1) 3.71 m 6.18 m 9.89 m
Image 3 (Shaheen 1) 3.56 m 6.36 m 9.92 m
Image 4 (Shaheen 1) 3.28 m 6.40 m 9.69 m
Image 5 (Shaheen 1) 4.27 m 7.15 m 11.43 m
Image 6 (Shaheen 1) 4.81 m 7.88 m 12.69 m
Image 7 (Shaheen 1) 4.45 m 7.18 m 11.64 m
Image 8 (Shaheen 1) 4.83 m 8 m 12.83 m
Image 23 (Shaheen 1) 4.75 m 7.45 m 12.20 m
Image 9 (M 9) 4.41 m 4.45 m 8.86 m
Image 10 (M 9) 4.08 m 4.81 m 8.89 m
Image 11 (M 9) 5.08 m 4.62 m 9.70 m
Image 12 (M 9) 3.53 m 4.87 m 8.40 m
Image 13 (M 9) 4.29 m 4.54 m 8.84 m
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The diameter of the Shaheen-1 and the M 9 can
be independently verified to be 1 metre. In the
case of the Shaheen 1 missile the rocket motor
lengths are longer than the rocket motor lengths
of the M 9. They also exhibit a trend of progressive
increase in lengths showing that Pakistan may
have internalised the technology they have
obtained from the Chinese and could now do
things on their own. The internalisation effort has
led to the two stage adaptation for Shaheen 2.
The dimensional similarities and the fact that in a
short span of five to six years Pakistan could
develop, test and operationalise these missiles
definitely points to significant technology inputs
from China.
A complete missile system comprises the
warhead, navigation, guidance and control system
to steer the missile, onboard computer and
avionics, instrumentation and telemetry system,
auxiliary systems and the propulsion system. Our
concentration in this paper will be on the propulsion
system, which is normally referred to as the missile
motor.  It is assumed that in all probability Pakistan
depends on imports from China for the navigation
systems and related electronics. It is also assumed
that Pakistan has adequate design and
manufacturing capability with reference to the
other missile systems.





Description of the Missile Motor
The solid fuelled missile propulsor, normally
referred to as a motor, is a system with no moving
parts. The main component is the propellant
grain, which is either cast in a mould and then
assembled into the motor case or directly
cast into the insulated motor case. The main
ingredients of such a propellant are an oxidiser
like Ammonium Perchlorate (AP), elastomers
like Poly Vinyl Chloride (PVC) or Hydroxyl
Terminated Poly Butadiene (HTPB), for fuel
and a metal fuel like Aluminum (Al) powder.
Small quantities of other chemical additives
like curators, catalysts and plasticisers
make up the complete composition.
The motor case is made of alloy steel or Fibre
Reinforced Plastic (FRP). The propellant is ignited
by a charge containing hot gas / particles.
The combustion gases are accelerated through
a nozzle which converts the pressure generated
by combustion into kinetic energy. For steering
the rocket, thrust vector control devices
like deflection of aerodynamic surfaces, jet
vanes, flexible nozzle bearing systems and
fluid injection in the nozzle are employed. As
stated earlier, Pakistan has benefitted from
French and Chinese technology inputs in its
6
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Thrust Vector Control None Jet vane and secondary injection system.
Probably flexible bearing system.
Manufacturing Equipments and machinery for
hardware fabrication, heat treatment,
pressure testing, propellant
processing and non- destructive
evaluation, grain charging, assembly
fixtures.
Equipments and machinery for hardware
fabrication, heat treatment, pressure
testing, propellant processing and non
destructive evaluation, assembly fixtures.
Testing Ground test stands and
instrumentation.
Single and 6 component test stands and
instrumentation.
Separation System Explosive cord stage separation
system.
Flexible Linear Shaped Charge (FLSC)
separation system.
Table 4: Inputs derived from French and Chinese Transfer of Technology
Motor Component French input Chinese input
Motor Case 15CdV6 steel composition,
fabrication and testing.
CrMnSiA steels with different percentage
of alloying elements, fabrication and
testing.
Insulation PVC tubing Nitrile and EPDM rubber
Propellant Free standing AP/PVC Plastisol
propellant grains.
Case bonded AP/Al/HTPB grains
(China has expertise in other solid
propellant compositions too).
Propellant Processing Raw material preparation, sigma
mixers, vacuum mixing, cast/cure,
machining and non destructive
evaluation (NDE) techniques.
Raw material preparation, vertical mixers,
vacuum casting, curing, machining
and non destructive evaluation (NDE)
techniques.
Nozzle Liner Moulded asbestos phenolic and silica
phenolic liners and paints,  graphite
throat insert.
Silica and carbon phenolic liners, tape
winding process, graphite throat insert.
Igniter Hot gas and particulate pyrotechnic
ignition system.
Pyrogen ignition system.
1.  Missile Case Hardware
It can be safely assumed that the motor casing
for all the Pakistani missiles is made of low alloy
steel. As indicated in the table above, technology
inputs for 15CdV6 steel with yield strength of 800
MPa would have come as part of the sounding
rocket technology transfer. Also this material is
Assessment of Pakistani Capabilities
Among the elements of the missile motor
described in the previous section, the hardware,
the propellant and the nozzle systems are the
complex ones, requiring special facilities and
manufacturing/processing techniques. These are
described below:
missile development effort. Table 4 summarises
the technology inputs Pakistan would have derived
from the French and the Chinese rocket/missile
technology transfers.
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freely available in sheet and forging form from a
number of steel makers in Europe. The fabrication
process also follows conventional rolling, welding,
heat treatment and machining process and can
be manufactured with the appropriate tooling.
The Chinese have developed high strength
low alloy steels for their missile and space motor
applications. Published information indicates that
for the JL 1 they have developed a weldable quality
steel. For space motor applications, they have
developed 45CrNiMoV steel, which has yield
strength of 1470 MPa and is equivalent to D6AC
steel used in many US rocket motors. The Chinese
have developed various steel alloys with carbon
content varying from 0.25 to 0.45%. The exact type
of steel, the Chinese have used in their M9/M11
programmes is not explicitly spelt out. One can
surmise that this will also be a low alloy steel
of the type developed for the JL 1. The steel
composition and fabrication process including the
tooling would form part of the M 11 technology
transfer package. The People’s Steel Mills Ltd7
located near Karachi produces alloy and special
steels. AISI 4340 produced by the Mill is of
aerospace grade and can be used for missile
motor case fabrication. The steel can be rolled
into sheets and can be forged. It is also amenable
for welding and can be heat treated to obtain
strength in the range of 1055 MPa. The Mill can
produce sheets of 3 mm or higher thickness and
hammer forged components upto 2000 kg weight.
Consequently, the missile case choice will be
15CdV6 for the earlier missile like Abdali and AISI
4340 for the later missiles like Ghaznavi, Shaheen
1 and Shaheen 2. This will pose no special
problems for the fabrication of 1 m diameter motor
cases.
2.  Propellant System
This is the heart of the missile motor and provides
the power for the launch and acceleration of the
missile. The propellant system constitutes the
major weight of the missile powerplant and
accounts for 80-90% of the missile initial mass.
Its preparation involves mixing the ingredients into
a thick slurry, casting the slurry into the insulated
motor case, curing it in an oven and doing the
finishing operations. The process as described
here appears quite simple, but in actuality, is quite
involved and a sequence of steps with due regard
to quality and safety have to be taken to obtain an
acceptable product.
Mention was made in Table 4 that Pakistan would
have obtained the technology of PVC plastisol
propellants from France. This is a low energy
system using ammonium perchlorate as oxidiser
and PVC as fuel, with typical specific impulse8 in
the region of 2050 N-s/kg. The main advantage of
the system is that the propellant is free standing
and its production is independent of the availability
of the motor hardware. Therefore the propellant
grains can be separately produced, stored and
charged into the hardware as required. From
handling and grain sagging considerations, the
maximum size of the grain is limited to 700-1000
kg. The Hatf 1, from the similarity of the fin
configuration to the French Sounding Rockets
appears to be a direct adaptation and would have
used the PVC based propellant. Pakistan has
however, improved the performance of the
subsequent variants of this missile—the Hatf 1A/
Abdali and in the process made improvements in
the propellant energetics by addition of aluminum
7 See more information on Peoples Steel Mills Ltd—Typical Grades at http://www.psmltd.com/flow.htm
8 Specific impulse is defined as the thrust produced per unit mass flow of propellant and is a figure of merit for a propellant system.
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or change of composition. They may have
replaced the free standing feature of the propellant
by directly casting into the case. The production
related advantages of a free standing grain system
have already been touched upon and it is therefore
likely that the free standing grain feature is still
retained.
For the larger missiles like the Ghaznavi, Shaheen
1 and 2, the propellant is cast directly into the
chamber using what is called the case-bonding
technique. The ingredients of this propellant will
be ammonium perchlorate, HTPB as fuel binder
and aluminum powder. Such systems can provide
a specific impulse in the region 2450 N-s/kg. The
basic technology would have come to Pakistan
as part of the M 11 technology transfer deal and
Pakistan would have extrapolated and innovated
on the technology for its larger missiles. The author
has not been able to obtain authenticated details
of Pakistani propellant material production
capabilities. It is stated in the NTI’s Pakistan profile
overview9, that a propellant plant was established
in Pakistan with Chinese help in 1997-98. As per
the overview, the Solid Propellant and Chemicals
Plant for Missiles owned by the National Defence
Complex (NDC) manufactures aluminum powder,
ammonium perchlorate oxidiser, HTPB binder,
curing agents and other ablative materials. In the
absence of any other corroborating evidence, the
NTI statement is used as the basis for gauging
the Pakistani production capabilities.
Ammonium Perchlorate (AP) is a major constituent
in solid propellant compositions. There are reports
9 On Pakistan see the website: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Missile/3294_3327.html
10 Missile Chronology Pakistan 1947-2002. Source: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Missile/
11 DX Zhang & DY Ye “Evolution of Solid Rocket Propulsion Technology for Space Missions in China“ , The Fourth Academy of China
Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation.
of ammonium perchlorate imports by Pakistan
prior to 1997-98 as evidenced by impounded
shipments of AP10 by Taiwan on 12 March 1996,
by Hong Kong on 29 April, 1996 and again by Hong
Kong on 13 December 1996. The impounded
quantities were respectively 15 tons, 15 tons and
10 tons. From this it would appear that the AP
production in Pakistan prior to 1996 was either
non-existent or inadequate for the programme.
With the commissioning of the NDC plant in
1997-98, this shortfall could have been overcome.
This could explain the absence of reports
pertaining to import/impounding of Ammonium
Perchlorate beyond 1996. Alternately, imports
could have continued (Hong Kong reverted to
China in 1997) through the land route from China.
The other major and minor constituents are either
manufactured in the NDC facility or procured from
the market. The processing equipments however
must have all come from China11.
3.  Nozzle and control systems
The nozzle is made of high temperature resistant
materials as the hot combustion gases are
accelerated through it. The critical elements here
are high temperature erosion resistant materials
and their fabrication. The materials are termed as
ablative materials and are essentially carbon or
silica fabric reinforced plastics. Phenolic resin is
the matrix system. Graphite is generally used as
the nozzle throat material. As part of the M 11
technology transfer, the Chinese may have
supplied the processing equipments but not the
technology for producing the raw materials.
9
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This guess is made on the premise that the
technology for the ablative reinforcements like
carbon and silica is quite different as opposed to
the propellant chemicals. Also the quantity
demand is not very high and it is not difficult to
procure these materials from China or through
traders. The technology of making large sized
graphite blocks indigenously is also difficult and
this requirement is also likely to be met through
import.
For missile steering purposes, besides using the
aerodynamic control surfaces, the Chinese have
adopted rotating nozzles and secondary injection
in their missiles of 1960/70 vintage (JL-1 for
example)12. In the later space motors, they have
used flexible bearing nozzles13. Rotating nozzle
is useful only for multiple nozzle systems. As all
the Pakistan missiles have a single nozzle, the
missile steering will be based on secondary
injection, reaction control systems and
aerodynamic surfaces.
It may not be difficult for Pakistan to procure all
the materials required for making nozzles and
control systems. The Chinese trading company
<Alibaba.com> founded in 1999 lists many of the
materials required for missile propellant and nozzle
making.
Production Cycle
The production of the missile is governed by the
major subsystem process time. In the missile
subsystems listed in the previous section, the
motor case will in all probability be supplied by a
fabrication industry. Steel fabricators will have the
setup for tooling, machining, welding, heat
treatment, inspection and pressure testing. The
requirement of sheets and forgings can even be
procured from abroad to supplement the
indigenous production. The processing of
propellants and nozzles on the other hand will be
mostly done inhouse.
The process steps and production cycle
for case bonded propellant systems is shown
in figure 2. The process durations are for a
Shaheen class of motor. The estimated time
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Fig 2: Propellant Process Flow Chart
The process duration, assuming the input raw
materials and motor case hardware is available is
estimated to be 22 days. Critical facilities like the
mixing station and cast / cure station are duplicated
for increasing the throughput and for maintaining
production in case of breakdown or mishap in one
of the stations. The longest occupancy is of 9 days
in the cure station which will govern the total
production throughput. 25 units (Ghaznavi and
Shaheen 1 will account for one unit each while
Shaheen 2 will account for 2 units—one unit for
each stage motor) could be produced in a year of
250 working days based on this estimate. This
assumes that the essential inputs like hardware
and raw material flow are maintained to sustain
this rate of production and that there is no
queueing in some critical facilities like non-
destructive evaluation. Real life conditions are far
from ideal and there are bound to be disruptions,
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technical glitches, which will have an impact on
production. The actual annual production can be
expected to be lower than this number.
Figure 3 depicts the missile nozzle, which is made
up of two parts—the convergent section and a
cone or bell shaped divergent section. The two
sections are processed separately and then
assembled together.  As explained earlier thermal
resistant materials like carbon phenolic (CP) and
silica phenolic (SP) are used for thermal
protection. Graphite is used for the throat section.
Each of these is processed separately, machined
and then bonded to the hardware. A final
machining of the assembly results in the required
contour. The process is quite involved as
dimensional matching between mating parts is
involved and the liners have to be cleared through
inspection and non-destructive evaluation at
several points during the production process.
Figure 4 details the steps involved in the realisation
of nozzle liners along with the approximate
process times. Practically all the steps are in
sequence and therefore the operations are serial.
It should be noted that the process time indicated
is for either the convergent or the divergent
section. To realise one complete nozzle assembly,
the total process time gets doubled. The process
time indicated is representative for the nozzle of
a  Shaheen class of missile.
The cycle time for a sub-assembly is of the order
of 33 days and on a continuous basis a theoretical
frequency of one sub assembly every 10 days
could be maintained. On this basis, in a 250
working day year 25 nozzle convergent or
divergent sub-assemblies, i.e. 12 full nozzle
assemblies can be realised. As in the case of the
propellant system, this will assume timely
availability of inputs like raw materials, structural
hardware, mating control system components (like
secondary injection thrust vector system) and no
queuing in any work station.
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Throughput can be increased by having more work
stations, but cost, quantity requirements of input
materials, process tooling, space and operational
requirements pose constraints. The thermal
protection system for the re-entry vehicle requires
the same materials and processes. It is quite
possible, the two requirements are made in the
same facility or co-located facility, sharing some
of the process and inspection equipments. This
facility could also be under the control of the
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission as part of
the warhead preparation unit.
Though the propellant processing numbers could
be higher, it is appropriate to peg the production
to match the nozzle production numbers. It would
therefore appear that 12 motor assemblies
per year will suffice to match with the 12 nozzle
assemblies. This number also seems more
realistic, keeping in mind the inventories, hardware
flow, process tool sets, accessories, plant upkeep,
maintenance, storage, transportation and related
issues. An examination of the Pakistani missile launch
log is also indicative of lower order of production.
The Pakistani missile launch log shows a total of
26 launches between April 1999 and December
2006. (22 of these missiles have been launched
between May 2002 and December 2006). Out of
these 7 are Ghauri missiles, which have a liquid
power plant. Therefore excluding these we have
a total of 19 solid propellant missiles comprising
Abdali, Ghaznavi, Shaheen 1 and Shaheen
2 launched between 1999 and 2006. The launch
log relating to the solid propellant missiles is shown
in table 5.
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Table 5: Pakistan Solid Propellant Missile Launch Log
Date Missile Type Launch Summary
April 15, 1999 SHAHEEN 1 Year No. of launches
February 7, 2000 HATF 1 1998 0
May 26, 2002 GHAZNAVI 1999 1
May 28, 2002 ABDALI 2000 1
October 4, 2002 SHAHEEN 1 2001 0
October 8, 2002 SHAHEEN 1 2002 4
March 26, 2003 ABDALI 2003 4
October 3, 2003 GHAZNAVI 2004 3
October 8, 2003 SHAHEEN 1 2005 2
October 14, 2003 SHAHEEN 1 2006 4
March 9, 2004 SHAHEEN 2 Total 19
December 8, 2004 SHAHEEN 1
November 29, 2004 GHAZNAVI Missile Type No. of launches
March 19,2005 SHAHEEN 2 Abdali 5
March 31,2005 ABDALI Ghaznavi 4
February 19 2006 ABDALI Shaheen 1 7
April 29th 2006 SHAHEEN 2 Shaheen 2 3
November 29th 2006 SHAHEEN 1 Total 19
December 9th 2006 GHAZNAVI
In the case of Shaheen 1, there is a long gap of
three and a half years between the first and second
flight. The 1999 flight of Shaheen 1 was the first
one after the NDC plant came up in 1997/98. In
spite of the M 9 pedigree, there could have been
problems in the first flight. The identification of the
issue, its correction and confirmatory tests
may account for the time between the flights.
Subsequent numbers and frequency is indicative
of a satisfactory solution to the problem.
The propellant mass in these missiles is estimated
based on the missile powerplant dimensions
determined from the images14 and is used to
compute the propellant mass in the missiles. Data
from the year 2002 is taken for computing the total
annual propellant quantity used for the missile
flights. The details are shown in table 6.
14 n. 1
14
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Table 6: Missile Propellant Estimates
Missile Flown Estimated Total propellant produced
Year Propellant Mass, for flight tests in a particular
Name Nos. tonnes year, tonnes
2002 Ghaznavi 1 3.78
Abdali 1 1.03
Shaheen 1 2 6.3 x 2 17.41
2003 Abdali 1 1.03
Ghaznavi 1 3.78
Shaheen 1 2 6.3 x 2 17.41
2004 Shaheen 2 1 4.0 + 1.54*
Ghaznavi 1 3.78
Shaheen 1 1 6.3 15.62
2005 Shaheen 2 1 4 + 1.54*
Abdali 1 1.03 6.57
2006 Abdali 1 1.03
Shaheen 2 1 4.0 + 1.54*
Shaheen 1 1 6.3
Ghaznavi 1 3.78 16.65
*Shaheen 2 has two stages and the propellant mass of each stage is indicated
One can conclude from the table that Pakistan
has approximately used 17.5 tonnes of finished
propellant quantity per annum for flight purposes.
It may not be right to peg the production at this
rate as some of the units could be used for ground
qualification requirements and for stockpiling. As
the missiles could be transported and stored under
different terrain and weather conditions, they are
subjected environmental conditioning to simulate
such conditions followed by proving tests. Also a
minimum number of flight tests are required to
confirm the system performance and firm up the
CEP. Some numbers are also earmarked for crew
training purposes. Each country follows its own
guidelines with regard to the number of proving
flights required before declaring a system
operational. The US services employ a very
comprehensive test programme for their
missiles15. The R&D tests number about 24 each
for the Minuteman, the Peacekeeper and the
Trident missiles. It is unlikely that Pakistan would
plan such an extensive test programme for its
missiles. From time and cost considerations, it will
opt for deriving the maximum inputs from minimal
tests through extensive instrumentation and from
the inputs drawn from the exposure to the Chinese
M 9/M 11 programmes. An assessment of the
minimum complement of tests is shown in table 7.
15 Staff Working Paper, “The MX Missile Test Program“, The Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, January
1986
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Table 7: No. of Tests for Operationalisation
Test Objective Ground tests Flight Tests Remarks
Motor Development 2
Motor Qualification 3
Development Flights — 2
Qualification Flights — 3
Training Flights 5 2 tests by development crew with the service
crews.
1 tests by service crews with development crew
support.
2 tests by service crews with development crew
supervision.
Surveillance Tests 1 — This requirement is infrequent and is used for
checking the aging criteria of the propulsion
system.
Total 6 10
A total of 16 motors will have to be ground and
flight tested for declaring the system operational.
The number can be pruned to some extent. The
surveillance test is an infrequent requirement with
the objective of ensuring the soundness of the
motor with storage time. The motor will be drawn
from the production batch as the need arises and
hence it need not be counted as a prerequisite for
operationalisation. Part of the crew training tests
can be combined with the qualification tests. This
would mean a complement of 5 ground and 7 flight
tests would be required to declare the missile
system operational. Based on this assessment,
the following inferences are drawn:
Abdali: Published reports as well as the fin shape
of Hatf 1 confirm the Sud Aviation sounding rocket
ancestry of this missile. Abdali is a modified
version of this and uses the acquired French
technology for PVC based propellants. It is
possible that Pakistan has improved on the
composition by adding a certain percentage of
aluminum to improve its energy. Abdali is a short
range tactical missile and intended to be produced
in numbers. Pakistan has long experience in the
manufacture of this type of propellant and rocket
system and consequently would have required
very little development and qualification effort. The
modifications may not significantly alter the
primary parameters and therefore add to the test
numbers. Therefore the earlier Hatf 1 flights
along with 5 Abdali missile launches till December
2006 may meet the criteria for operationalisation.
Based on this argument, it is concluded that
a) the propellant is produced in the SUPARCO
plant, using a modified PVC composition and
retaining the free standing feature of the propellant
grain; and b) the missile is in production and
inducted into the services.
Ghaznavi: This missile is derived from the
Chinese M 11 missile. Pakistan is also reported
to have procured 34-80 of these missiles including
the manufacturing know-how. The Chinese
16
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connection would have provided adequate
technology inputs to Pakistan and enabled it to
make the design transition to Ghaznavi. The M 11
pedigree would have also enabled Pakistan to
derive confidence with the minimum number of
qualification tests. The first test16 of this missile
was reported on May 26, 2002 and the fourth on
December 9, 2006. According to the Islamic
Republic News Agency—IRNA17 dated April 26,
2007 “the solid fuel Ghaznavi Ballistic Missile
System was successfully fired as part of a training
exercise in December last year by troops.” To
quote the main story carried by the news agency18
“Pakistan on Thursday handed over a batch of
nuclear capable ballistic missiles to the army at a
ceremony attended by Prime Minister Shaukat
Aziz, state media reported. The final production
batch of Hatf III ‘Ghaznavi’ missiles was handed
over to the Army Strategic Force Command
(ASFC), Radio Pakistan reported”. Based on this
report, it is safe to conclude the missile is in
production and inducted into the army. It is safe
to assume that the service crews already are
trained in the preparation and launch of M 11 and
as such will require very little training and
adaptation to the Ghaznavi. Also the production
of Ghaznavis may be pegged at a lower number
keeping in mind the existing inventory of M 11
missiles. The production batch of Ghaznavis
handed over to the ASFC may number 6-8.
Shaheen 1: There is a gap of three and a half
years between the first and second flight tests of
Shaheen-1. This could be due to technical
problems/failure19 encountered in the first flight.
Between 2002 and 2006, the missile has been
flight tested 6 times with two missile tests each in
2002 and 2003.
The test of November 29, 2006 is reported to be
carried out by the troops of the ASFC as per press
reports20. The report also stated “the event marked
the culmination phase of the training exercise and
validated the operational readiness of the strategic
missile group equipped with Shaheen 1 Missiles”.
This statement confirms the development phase
of the missile is complete and the missile is ready
for production and operational deployment. Also
the numbers flight tested is in conformity with the
numbers shown in table 7. It is certain that
Pakistan would accord production priority to hand
over the first batch of missiles to the ASFC at an
early date.
Shaheen 2: Four flight tests—one each in
2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007—of this missile have
been reported so far. Being a two stage system, it
is more complex and will have higher reliability
issues. In tune with table 7 figures, further 3
flights of this missile are required for completely
qualifying the system. In this case also a higher
priority for completion of the remaining tests is
obvious.
The scenario discussed above is summarised in
Table 8.
16 “Pak test-fires another missile”, Tribune (Chandigarh), 27 May 2002, Available at the website: http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/
20020527/main2.htm
17 For details see the website: http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-16/0704268066191425.htm
18 Ibid;
19 See the website: http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/shaheen1.htm
 20 See “Pakistan Test Fires Nuclear-Capable Missile” Space Wars,  November 29, 2006, Available at the website: http://www.spacewar.com/
reports/Pakistan_Test_Fires_Nuclear_Capable_Missile_999.html
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Table 8: Status Summary
Missile Status
Abdali ❀ Development complete
❀ Troop exercise complete
❀ The missile is under batch
production and handed over to
ASFC
Ghaznavi ❀ Development complete
❀ Troop exercise complete
❀ Production batch (6-8 missiles)
handed  over to ASFC
❀ Production priority may shift to
Shaheen 1 & Shaheen 2
Shaheen 1 ❀ Development complete
❀ Troop exercise complete
❀ Production batch being readied
for handing over to ASFC
Shaheen 221 ❀ Development flight tests in
progress




Based on the production cycle, it has been argued
in the previous sections that the missile motor
grain and nozzle production will be 12 units per
year. This excludes Abdali which is probably being
produced in the SUPARCO plant. The NDC plant
at Fatehjang is reported to be operational during
1997-9822. It can be safely assumed that it may
have taken some years for the plant to attain full
rated capacity. Further, the realisation of the full
rated capacity is dependent upon a number of
external parameters like timely availability of
hardware, input materials, resolution of technology
glitches and quality issues and this hampers the
rated capacity realization. The fact that Pakistan
has flown only 14 Ghaznavi, Shaheen 1 and
Shaheen 2 missiles in the 7 year period between
1999 and 2006 is a pointer to this. A likely missile
propulsion system production scenario is inferred
from these pointers and is shown in Table 9.
21 It is not clear why Shaheen 2 does not use Shaheen 1 powerplant for the booster stage. Besides obvious improvement in the range,
it will add to the standardization of hardware and reduction in the number of qualifying tests and reduction in the number of process
and handling tools. It will also provide flexibility of interchange. It is possible that they are designed and produced by two different
groups. The similarity of the stage 1 dimensions to the Chinese M – 9 may have some bearing.
22 See, n.10
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Table 9:  Production & Utilisation Summary
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Stock inventory in
Missile 2007
Ghaznavi
Production 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 6 missiles handed
to ASFC
Ground Test 1 2 2 - - - - - -
Flight Test - - - - 1 1 1 - 1
Shaheen 1
Production 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 4 missiles
Ground Test 1 2 2
Flight Test 1 2 2 1 1
Shaheen 2
Production 1 1 1 1 1 1 Nil
Ground Test 1 1 1
Flight Test 1 1 1
Total 3 3 4 5 5 6 5 6 6
Production  units units units units units units units units units
Notes: 1. There is a lag between the production and utilisation.
2. One unit comprises the motor hardware, propellant grain, nozzle, ignition and control systems
(excluding reaction control system)
3. Each stage of Shaheen 2 is considered as one unit
4. The number of Shaheen 2 ground tests could be less based on Shaheen 1 experience
Observations and Inferences
1. Immediately after the readiness of the plant
in 1997-98, one flight of Shaheen 1 has taken
place in 1999. Thereafter no flights of
Ghaznavi, Shaheen 1 and Shaheen 2 are
reported till 2002.
2. Two flights of Shaheen 1 in October 2002 are
closely spaced.
3. Two further closely spaced flights of Shaheen
1 have taken place in October 2003—almost
exactly a year later.
4. The long gap between the flight of 1999 and
the flights of 2002 is indicative of a major
problem in the 1999 flight and which have
taken time to resolve and qualify the corrected
design.
5. Preparing two articles for testing is a
commonly accepted practice. The second unit
can be tested to re-confirm the article
performance. At the same time further
modifications, if required can be quickly
carried out on the second article.
6. It also shows that two Shaheen 1’s per year
could be the current capacity, based on input
materials and plant constraints.
7. It is unlikely that the Shaheen 2 preparations
would have started till confidence in the
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Shaheen 1 performance is gained. Shaheen
2 is a new design, derives from the pedigree
of Shaheen 1 and therefore its ground tests
could have started after confirmation of the
Shaheen 1 corrections and proving ground
tests—ie., in 2001.
8. No flights of the strategic missiles have taken
place in 2005. Two Abdali flights perhaps are
gap fillers. The reasons for this could be:
a) Some technical issues with the other
missile systems
b) Some problem with the plant equipment
or shortage of raw materials.
c) Some technical issues with the Shaheen
2 flight
d) Deliberate scheduling
Out of these, the problem with the plant
equipment or shortage of critical raw material
like Ammonium Perchlorate appears as the
more plausible reason.
Production Forecast
On the basis of the assessment done in this study,
one can make a modest attempt in forecasting
Pakistan’s solid propellant missiles production
capacity. The forecast is elaborated below:
Ghaznavi
The production numbers of this missile are not
likely to be high until the M 11 stocks are liquidated.
M 11 import numbers vary between 34 to 80. In
the absence of any conflict situations, the
application of these missiles will be restricted for
regular crew training drills and flight tests of new
or improved missile systems. The M 11 missiles
are 8 to 10 years old and maybe near the end of
their life. Though it may be possible to extend their
life, Pakistan will consider phasing them out in two
to three years time and replace them with the
higher capability Ghaznavi. This exercise has
begun with the handing over of the first batch of
Ghaznavis to ASFC in April 2007.
Shaheen 1
.
With completion of seven flight tests, the
qualification and training of the ASFC personnel
can be treated as complete and the first production
batch is being readied for handing over to the
ASFC. It should be possible to hand the first batch
of six motors to ASFC in 2008. Readiness of
further batch numbers will be based on priority
accorded to the missile types. Assuming Ghaznavi
and Shaheen 1 are accorded equal priority, a batch
of six flight units can be readied once every two
years.
Shaheen 2
Four flight tests have been completed. Three
more tests are to be completed for qualification
and training purposes. Even if some level of
priority is accorded, the readiness of the first
production batch is minimum five to six years
away.
The development time of Shaheen 2 could have
been shortened if Shaheen 1 stage had been used
in the missile. The reason for not adapting this
is not clear. In future developments, it is most
likely that Pakistan will change booster stage
dimension to that of Shaheen 1 with the attendant
advantages. Possibility of incorporating a third
stage cannot be completely ruled out.
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Conclusion
A study of the Pakistan strategic missile production
scenario is presented. The conclusions on the
maximum number of missiles that can be
produced have been derived based on the process
time. The theoretical numbers have been
compared with the actual known flight information
and it is concluded that Pakistan currently has not
exploited the full production potential. This may
be due to material constraints, input hardware
constraints, number of toolings availability,
transportation and storage constraints. It does not
appear to be due to any technology shortcomings.
Ghaznavi and Shaheen 1 are in production, while
Shaheen 2 needs to undergo further flight trials
before it can be declared operational.
Present production appears to be six units per year
consisting of two units each of Ghaznavi and
Shaheen 1 and 1 stage each of Shaheen 2.
The typical product mix for the production of
twelve units per year could consist of three
numbers of each of the missiles. However,
the number can be altered to a different mix
based on the existing priority needs. Estimates
of Pakistan’s nuclear warheads are put at sixty
as per the 2007 assessment prepared by
Natural Resources Defence Council23. Assuming
two thirds of these will use missiles as carriers
(the rest could use aircraft delivery), it would
take about four year’s production effort at
the full rated capacity of 12 units per year to
match the missile and warhead numbers.
This would mean that only by 2011-2012, Pakistan
would be able to provide the missile carrier
system for all these warheads. The time period
may be even slightly stretched to account
for design modifications and requirements of
training/surveillance tests.
23 NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (Chicago: USA), V. 63, no. 3, May/June 2007, pp. 71-73.
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